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Case No. 18245 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with burglary, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., S 76-6-2021 and 
theft by receiving, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-408. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him 
guilty on both counts on January 4, 1982, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
presiding. Appellant was sentenced on January 8, 1982 to an 
indefinite term of zero to five years for the burglary count 
and six months for the theft by receiving count. The sentence 
was stayed for 30 days while the Board of Pardons considered 
whether the State Hospital program was appropriate for 
appellant, and.judgment was finally entered February 10, 1982. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming 
the trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant broke into a service station located at 
904 south 1300 East in Salt Lake City at approximately 3:00 
a.m. on September 18, 1981 (T. 24, 25). A neighbor next door 
heard the chain link fence rattle at about 2:45 a.m. (T. 24) 
and about five minutes later heard a window break (T. 25). 
The neighbor notified the police, who came to the station 
within five or ten minutes (T. 27, 31). The police contacted 
the store owner, and when he arrived on the scene the officers 
and the owner entered the station. They "took a quick visual 
check" (T. 16), noticed the padlock on the desk had been 
broken, the desk drawer was open, and the contents of that 
drawer were scattered around (T. 16). 
At that time, appellant was hiding in a closet (T. 
18). During the next forty-five minutes (T. 18), the police 
officers remained on the scene, making arrangements to tow 
appellant's truck from the service station lot (T. 18). The 
owner then returned, entered the building, and heard a loud 
noise (T. 18, 20). He and the officers found appellant, 
covered with dirty uniforms, hiding in the storage area behind 
an air compressor (T. 18). The police officer (T. 36), the 
station owner (T. 18), and appellant himself (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 2) all state that appellant was hiding. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although appellant did state that he was sleeping 
(T. 37), and now claims he only entered the building to sleep, 
the facts contradict this assertion. First, rather than 
sleeping, he made a loud noise which alerted the owner. 
Second, if he was searching for a place to sleep, his home was 
located between the service station and the place he left for 
the night (T. 11, 52, 53, 56, 63). 
Appellant does not appeal his conviction of theft by 
receiving. Appellant has been charged in the past with: 
theft, 1977; burglary, 1978; illegal consumption of alcohol by 
a minor, 1978; uttering a forged document, 1978; bench warrant 
for speeding, 1978; burglary, 1979; carrying a concealed 
weapon, 1979; criminal trespass and possession of burglary 
tools, 1981 (R. 6-8). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS. 
In this case, appellant requested several jury 
instructions based on criminal-trespass (R. 32-34, 37). He 
now claims that the trial court erred in refusing to give his 
requested criminal trespass instructions. First, according to 
appellant, criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of 
the crime of burglary. Second, criminal trespass is his 
defense theory. Thus, appellant concludes he was entitled to 
-3-
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a jury instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included 
offense to burglary. 
Appellate cites State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 
463 P.2d 811, 814 (1970) for the proposition that an accused 
is entitled to jury instruction on lesser included offenses 
when they embody the theory on which he bases his defense. 
However, Gillian further requires that all of the evidence 
must be surveyed to see if "there is any reasonable basis 
therein which would support a conviction of the lesser 
offenses." Respondent contends that on the facts herein, 
there is not a reasonable basis in the evidence supporting a 
conviction of criminal trespass, either as a lesser included 
offense to burglary or as a separate offense. 
A. CRI~INAL TRESPASS IS NOT A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY. 
In determining whether an offense is a lesser 
included offense to another, this Court set forth the 
following standard: 
The rule as to when one offense is 
included in another is that the greater 
offense includes a lesser one when 
establishment of the greater wOii'Id 
necessarily include proof of all of the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when the proof of 
the lesser offense requires some element 
not involved in the greater offense that 
the lesser would not be an included 
offense (emphasis added). 
-4-
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State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27, 29 (1962). 
See also: State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709 (1980); 
State v. Cross, Utah, 649 P.2d 72 (1982)1 State v. Elliott, 
Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982). 
Again in State v. Williams, Utah, 636 P.2d 1092, 
1096 (1981), this Court ruled that: 
In order to be a "lesser included 
offense," the elements of the lesser 
offense must necessarily and always be 
included within the elements of the 
greater offense. 
The Utah Legislature has also set forth the same 
standard in Utah Code Ann., § 76-l-402(3)(a), which states 
that an offense is a lesser included offense when "it is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." 
Thus both Utah case law and statutes require a lesser included 
offense to contain all of the elements included in the greater 
offense. 
Respondent contends that the offense of criminal 
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary, under 
Utah statutes, because the elements differ. Utah Code Ann., 
S 76-6-202(1) describes burglary as: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit ·an 
assault on any person. 
-5-
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Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-206 ( 2) (a) describes criminal trespass 
as: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary ••• 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and; 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person thereon or damage to 
any property therein; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, 
other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether 
his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another. 
While both the burglary and the criminal trespass 
statutes require the actor to "enter or remain,• the intent 
element in the burglary statute is the "intent to commit a 
felony or theft or to commit an assault." The intent required 
to commit criminal trespass is different; it is the intent to 
cause annoyance or injury to a person, or damage to property, 
or to commit any crime other than a theft or felony. 
Appellant analyzes this difference in the intent 
elements by stating that burglary requires "a more specific 
intent" (Appellant's Brief at p. 10). Respondent contends 
that appellant's analysis is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, the two crimes require different specific intents; and, 
second, where two separate specific intents are involved, one 
cannot be more specific than the other. 
-6-
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Since burglary and criminal trespass involve 
different intent elements, proof of one is not proof of the 
other. In this case, the State proved that appellant 
committed burglary1 however, this proof did not also establish 
proof that appellant committed criminal trespass. The State 
did not introduce testimony or evidence to show that appellant 
intended to annoy or harm anyone. Instead, the evidence 
presented was that appellant broke the lock on a desk, looked 
through the contents and then hid when the police appeared (T. 
4, 16). Thus, the evidence introduced was intended to and did 
prove the burglary charge but could not also have proved 
criminal trespass. 
Respondent contends that this Court has recognized 
that criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of 
burglary, based on the differences in the elements of the 
offenses. In State v. Hendricks, Utah, 596 P.2d 633 (1979), 
the defendant claimed the jury should have been instructed on 
criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. 
In that case, two windows in a building were broken and two 
typewriters were moved near a window. The defendant, who had 
been hiding for an hour, was finally located in a closet. His 
defense was based on voluntary intoxication. This Court, in 
sustaining the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
criminal trespass, thought that the evidence: 
-7-
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established all of the elements of 
burglary but did not establish all of the 
elements of criminal trespass (emphasis 
added). 
Id., p. 634. In a footnote to that statement, this Court 
concluded •such in and of itself precludes the giving of the 
requested instructions.• Id., p. 634. 
Since the "unlawful entry or remaining" element was 
clearly established in the Hendricks case, the only element 
that could have differed was that of intent. Appellant, at 
page 11 of his brief, asserts that these statements quoted 
above in Hendricks, supra, indicate that this Court concluded 
criminal trespass was a lesser included offense to burglary. 
Respondent contends that the opposite interpretation is the 
logical conclusion from the Hendricks holding since this 
Court's reason for refusing to require an instruction on 
criminal trespass was that the elements of criminal trespass 
were not established. 
Appellant makes an additional claim that because 
criminal trespass and burglary are in the same part of the 
Code, it can be inferred that criminal trespass is a lesser 
included offense of burglary. However, the offense involving 
possession of burglary tools is also located in the same 
section of the Code, yet this Court has held that it is not an 
included offense to burglary. State v. Sumter, Utah, 550 P.2d 
184 (1978). Thus, it is incorrect to infer that offenses are 
lesser included offenses merely by their position in the Code. 
-8-
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Appellant cites three cases to support his theory 
that criminal trespass in Utah is a lesser included offense of 
burglary, Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1976): People v. 
Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 359 N.E.2d 1357 (1976): and 
Commonwealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975). These cases 
are not applicable to the facts herein. 
In Day v. State, supra, the criminal trespass 
statute differs significantly from the Utah statute. The 
Texas statute does not contain any of the specific intent 
provisions required by the Utah statute. Moreover, the test 
for giving lesser included instructions is less rigorous in 
Texas than in Utah and an instruction thereon in Texas may 
have been obligatory. 
The criminal trespass statute in People v. 
Henderson,_supra, is also dissimilar.to Utah's statute. 
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., Book 39, §§ 
140.05, 140.10, reveal that no specific intent element exists 
in the New York statute. 
Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, indicates that 
Pennsylvania's criminal trespass statute proscribes only 
unlicensed or unprivileged entry into a building or occupied 
structure; Thus, the elements of intent present in the Utah 
criminal trespass statute are absent from the Pennsylvania 
statute. 
Since the elements of the two offenses are not the 
same, proof of one is not proof of the other, and each offense 
-9-
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can be committed. without committing the other, criminal 
trespass is simply not an included offense in burglary. 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in refusing to grant 
appellant's requested instruction on criminal trespass. 
B. APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS WERE 
NOT WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED. 
The trial court denied appellant's requested jury 
instructions on criminal trespass because they were not 
justified by the evidence (R. 34). This Court, in State v. 
Close, 28 Utah 2a 144, 499 P.2d 287, 288 (1972), determined 
that instructions on lesser included offenses should be given 
"when such a conviction would be warranted by any reasonable 
view of the evidence •••• " (emphasis added). In State v. 
McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971), this Court, in 
discussing when lesser included offense instructions are 
warranted, stated that a party is justified in receiving the 
instruct ions: 
• • • only where there is some reasonable 
basis in the evidence to justify the 
giving of such instructions (emphasis 
added). 
Id., p. 891. Thus, even if criminal trespass were a lesser 
included offense of burglary, an instruction would only be 
warranted if based on a reasonable view of the evidence. 
-10-
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In addition, Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-402(4) requires 
jury instructions on lesser included offenses only if there is 
a rational basis for acquitting a defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
Respondent contends that in viewing the evidence, 
there is simply no reasonable basis upon which a finding that 
appellant was guilty of criminal trespass could be based. 
Appellant climbed a chain link fence, broke a window, and 
entered the gas station in the early morning hours. Nearby 
neighbors called the police when they heard appellant enter 
the building and the police arrived within a few minutes. 
During that short time period (approximately ten minutes), 
appellant had time to locate the desk, break the lock, and 
look through the contents for valuable items. Before he had 
the opportunity to take anything and escape, the police 
arrived. He then hid. The only possible inference from this 
evidence is that appellant was interrupted by the police while 
in the act of committing a burglary. 
In State v. Brooks, Utah, 631 P.2d 878 (1981) the 
trial court refused to reduce the charge from burglary to 
criminal· trespass (but did give a jury instruction on criminal 
trespass). In that case, the defendant entered the apartment 
through a window, turned off the power switch, apparently 
moved some jewelry (rings), and left quickly, taking nothing 
with him. This Court found that the trial court did not err 
-11-
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in refusing to reduce the charge to criminal trespass based 
upon the evidence of the late hour and defendant's sudden 
flight. However, the instruction on criminal trespass was 
warranted in that case because the defendant did not take 
anything although he had access to jewelry. 
In this case, however, appellant merely had no time 
to take anything. If he had not broken into the desk, or had 
left without taking anything, the evidence might support an 
instruction on criminal trespass~ but the evidence herein only 
supports a burglary charge and not a charge based on criminal 
trespass. 
In addition, respondent contends that appellant did 
not base his defense on criminal trespass and therefore no 
instruction was necessary on this theory. To commit criminal 
trespass, appellant must have intended to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person or damage to any property or have 
intended to commit any crime other than theft or a felony. 
Since appellant broke into the station at about 3:00 a.m., 
when the building was obviously dark and deserted, it is 
unlikely that he intended to annoy or harm anyone. As to 
damaging property, the only damage he did was to a window (to 
enter) and to a desk lock (which was in furtherance of 
burglary and not as an end in itself). In addition, he does 
not contend that he ~lanned another crime. He allegedly only 
wanted a place to sleep. 
-12-
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Appellant's friend, Poul Jensen, testified 
concerning appellant's alcohol consumption and activities 
before the burglary. Appellant's counsel asked Mr. Jensen 
questions concerning appellant's "hyperactivity• and he did 
state that appellant might want to •cause some trouble or 
something like that" (T. 171). However, on cross-examination 
Mr. Jensen admitted that appellant had not suggested that they 
do anything after leaving the last bar and amended his answer, 
stating "not so much cause trouble. Look for something to do" 
(T. 177). Thus, even appellant's own witness' testimony did 
not present a defense based on criminal trespass. 
Incidentally, appellant's witness does not bolster appellant's 
defense of looking for a place to sleep since the witness said 
appellant was "hyperactive" when drinking •. 
Appellant also claims that this case is similar to 
other cases in which the charge of burglary was reduced to 
criminal trespass, based on insufficient evidence. Appellant 
cites Crawford v. State, 241 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1968)7 State v. 
Rood, 11 Ariz. App. 102, 462 P.2d 399 (1969), and State v. 
Kahinu, 53 Hawaii 646, 500 P.2d 747 (1972), to support his 
proposition. However, these cases are factually 
"t:3:l.stinguishable and support the proposition that felonious 
intent in a burglary case may be established by circumstantial 
evidence. 
In Crawford v. State, supra, there was no evidence 
that the garage where defendant was found hiding contained any 
-13-
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property. In addition there were several broken windows 
through which appellant could have entered without using 
force. Under these facts, the court determined that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of burglary 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it was insufficiency of the 
evidence and not the use of circumstantial evidence which 
precluded conviction. In fact, the Court stated that: 
we agree with the appellee [the state] 
• • • that intent may be established by 
inference from the circumstances 
surrounding an act. 
Id. at 797. 
In State v. Rood, supra, the facts of the case again 
irrlicated that the entry was not forced (into an unlocked 
building). Although this entry was insufficient to establish 
felonious intent the court stated that •proof of intent can be 
shown by circumstantial evidence,• Id. at 400, and •criminal 
intent is usually proven by circumstantial evidence.• Id. at 
401. 
Similarly, in State v. Kanihu, supra, the evidence 
tended to show the motel room in which the appellant entered 
was unlocked. The room had been previously occupied by the 
defendant's girlfriend. Also, the defendant's flight from the 
room was justified by the evidence that appellant suffered 
from paranoia as a result of L.S.D. use. These facts led the 
court to find that the defendant lacked the requisite intent 
-14-
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to commit burglary. However, the court recognized that: 
Intent in a burglary case can be 
established by inference from the 
surrounaing circumstances and accompanying 
and attendant acts of the person accused. 
Id. at 749. Thus, these cases are not similar to this case 
because the evidence in those cases raised a close factual 
question concerning intent while in this case, the evidence 
strongly supports an inference that appellant's only intent 
was to commit a burglary. Since appellant's theory of 
criminal trespass is not supported by any evidence, the trial 
court correctly ref used to instruct the jury on criminal 
trespass, whether as a lesser included offense or simply the 
appellant's-theory of the case. 
Even if appellant was entitled to jury instructions 
on criminal trespass, any trial court error was not 
prejudicial in this case. The appellant claims that his 
rights were prejudiced because, in deciding whether any 
evidence supported the intent element of criminal trespass, 
the trial court allegedly usurped the jury's function. 
Respondent contends that the jury, in its proper 
role, indeed did determine the question of intent. Both 
appellant's-and the State's closing arguments centered on this 
element, carefully informing the jury that it must determine 
the question of appellant's intent (T. 190, 191, 197, 200-203, 
209). The jury instructions also emphasized that the jury was 
-15-
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required to determine appellant's intent (R. 75, 77). Thus, 
the jury's attention was focused on determining appellant's 
intent, which, in order to convict, had to be the specific 
intent to commit a felony or theft. 
In this case the jury properly inferred intent from 
appellant's acts: breaking and entering, breaking into a 
desk, and hiding. State v. Baldwin, 29 Utah 2d 318, 509 P.2d 
350 (1973) involved similar facts. Police officers observed 
the defendants entering a building at 1:00 a.m. They saw the 
defendants walk in and out of off ices, and arrested them as 
they left the building. The officers found that some desk 
drawers had been rifled and articles removed and left in 
dissaray~ however, the only items found on the defendants were 
lock pick tools. This Court found that the "failure to steal 
after entering with the intent is no defense to the crime of 
burglary." Id. at 351. Thus, although appellant did not take 
anything, the jury in its proper role inferred that his intent 
was to commit a felony or a theft. 
The jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
appellant's guilt, and the conviction is supported by the 
evidence. Thus, since there is no real evidence (beyond 
appellant's counsel's theory) of criminal trespass, the jury's 
verdict should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case did not warrant a jury 
instruction, and the trial court properly refused to give 
appellant's requested instructions on criminal trespass. 
Thus, whether criminal trespass is an included offense of 
burglary is immaterial since the evidence did not support it 
as appellant's theory of the case either as a lesser included 
offense or as a separate defense. 
;H 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of November, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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